19, January 2024
The Anglophone Crisis: Anti-Terror Laws Undermine Genuine Conflict Resolution in Cameroon 0
Since 2016, the Anglophone separatist movement in Cameroon has become characterised by political violence. Armed separatists have imposed boycotts on education, burned down schools and infrastructure, and abducted or killed civilians accused of collaborating with francophone authorities.
In October 2016, lawyer and teacher unions held a series of protests in the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. They were protesting the economic, cultural, and linguistic discrimination of the Anglophone minority by the Francophone majority. The protests were peaceful, and took place after a series of formal requests to remove the French language from schools and courts in the Anglophone regions were denied. The government response to these peaceful protests was disproportionate. Over a period of several months, the government used an anti-terror law to imprison and charge Anglophone leaders with the death penalty. In addition, security forces arrested over 100 protestors, killed four, dissolved multiple Anglophone civil society organisations, shutdown internet access, and closed school and medical facilities.
The disproportionate response to the protests – notably through the use of the anti-terrorism law – catalysed the violent “Anglophone crisis” in Cameroon. As a consequence, it eliminated opportunities for peaceful solutions to the conflict. Public opinion in the Anglophone regions hardened, and initially modest requests for administrative reforms, such as the protection of the common-law tradition and English-speaking schools, turned into calls for outright secession and the formation of an independent state called Ambazonia. The resulting conflict between separatists and Cameroonian security forces has killed over six thousand people in Cameroon’s two English-speaking regions and internally displaced over seven hundred thousand.
The origin of the Anglophone crisis is colonial; in 1916, the German colony of Kamerun was distributed to France and Britain as Cameroun and the British Southern Cameroons. In 1961, the two territories reunified as a federated state. The Constitution granted two official languages, education systems, and legal systems to represent the French and British systems of government. In reality, power was consolidated by leaders in the francophone capital, Yaoundé. Anglophone Cameroonians have complained of political and economic marginalisation since.
What has been overlooked is that the adoption of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1373 presented an opportunity to better develop the state arsenal that ensured power and control over resources, which remained in Yaoundé. Adopted in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, resolution 1373 required all UN member states to implement domestic anti-terror legislation. In reality, adherence to resolution 1373 created the context under which the Cameroonian government could eliminate the Anglophone self-determination movement, by framing its repression as counterterrorism. Since that time, studies have identified a strong correlation in some states between the strong adoption of anti-terror legislation and the desire to inhibit protests and penalise government dissent. The 2014 anti-terror law, promulgated in adherence to resolution 1373, is a highly effective tool for eliminating government dissent for several reasons: First, the anti-terror law “doubles up” on the penal code. This creates a dual legal system that is applied selectively according to who the Cameroonian government considers a threat. For example, after the 2016 protests, leaders of Anglophone civil society organisations were arrested and charged with the death penalty under the anti-terror law for “acts of terrorism, complicity in acts of terrorism, insurrection, rebellion against the state, incitement of civil unrest, propagation of false news.” Under the penal code, the death penalty is only applicable in states of emergency, siege or war. Under the anti-terror law, the death penalty becomes applicable in peacetime. Although the Cameroonian government relies more on the threat of the death penalty than on executions themselves, it is the selective application (at the discretion of government-appointed military judges) that deters opposition.
Second, the anti-terror law is approved by the international community. Because it is pursuant to the requirements of resolution 1373, it becomes difficult to criticise when it is used for illiberal intentions instead of a response to genuine threats of terrorism. The UNSC, for example, has only held one informal discussion on the situation in Cameroon, on 13 May 2019 – it focused on the humanitarian situation, not the use of the anti-terror law. The mutual evaluation reports that evaluate state compliance to resolution 1373 are also telling. In the 2022 report for Cameroon, written by the Task Force on Anti-Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC), the Cameroonian government was praised for using the anti-terror law against the Boko Haram militants in the Far North region and against the Anglophone separatists in the Northwest and Southwest regions. In doing so, the report constructs a moral equivalence between the Boko Haram terrorist group and the Anglophone separatists. These two groups not only have dramatically different goals and intentions, but utilise violence differently: for religious ideological nationalism in the former, and political goals of self-determination in the latter. By applauding the Cameroonian government for its use of anti-terror law against both groups, the GABAC implicitly approves of the denial of Anglophone self-determination by the Cameroonian government. As a consequence, Cameroon serves as an example of the spread of international norms for illiberal purposes.
Third, by designating the Anglophone separatists as “terrorists,” the anti-terror law has eliminated democratic avenues for dialogue on the issue of Anglophone self-determination, and successfully consolidated power in the francophone government. When the Cameroonian government used the anti-terror law to arrest the Anglophone leaders, the government signalled the self-determination movement as a threat and depoliticised it. This has been identified as a catalyst for the violent shift in the Anglophone movement and the civil war we see today, because democratic avenues for self-determination and dialogue were removed. Efforts at dialogue and the granting of a “special status” to the English-speaking territories have not minimised separatist violence, but instead allowed the elimination of legitimate political opposition and blurred the lines between self-determination movements and terrorism.
In sum, the use of the anti-terror law has not just eliminated opportunities for Anglophone self-determination, but has resulted in increased political violence: the very problem it was intended to solve.
Culled from Australian Institute of International Relations


















22, January 2024
Liberia’s new president Boakai sworn in with pledge to ‘rescue’ Africa’s oldest republic 0
Liberia’s new president, Joseph Boakai, was sworn into office Monday after his narrow win in a November election. Boakai, who at age 79 is the country’s oldest sitting head of state, promised to unite and rescue Africa’s oldest republic from its economic woes.
“Partisanship must give way to nationalism,” Boakai told citizens and foreign delegation members who attended his inauguration ceremony in Monrovia, Liberia’s capital. He listed improving adherence to the rule of law, fighting corruption and renewing “the lost hope” of citizens as his priorities.
The ceremony, however, ended abruptly after Boakai, who wore traditional Liberian attire for the occasion, began to show signs of physical distress while speaking. Officials led him away from the podium after he unsuccessfully tried to continue his address.
A spokesperson for Boakai’s political party said the president’s weakness was caused by heat and had nothing to do with his health.
Boakai has dismissed concerns about his age, arguing that it came with a wealth of experience and achievements that would benefit the country.
He won a tight run-off election to defeat Liberia’s youngest-ever president, George Weah. Public goodwill toward soccer legend-turned-politician Weah waned as he neared the end of his first six-year term. Critics accused him of not fulfilling campaign promises to fix Liberia’s ailing economy, stamp out corruption and to ensure justice for victims of the country’s back-to-back civil wars between 1989 and 2003.
Boakai, who earned a university degree in business administration, has been active in Liberia’s national politics since the 1980s, when he served as the agriculture minister. Starting in 2006, he spent 12 years as vice president under Africa’s first democratically elected female leader, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.
He lost his first run for the presidency in 2017 to Weah, who took over from Sirleaf in the West African nation’s first democratic transfer of power since the end of its civil wars. Boakai touted his second presidential campaign as a rescue mission to free Liberians from what he described as Weah’s failed leadership.
His promises notwithstanding, any positive changes from the new Liberian leader are likely to come slowly considering how different Boakai’s agenda is from his predecessors, according to Ibrahim Nyei, a researcher and political analyst at Liberia’s Ducor Institute for Social and Economic Research.
“It is not going to be a walk in the park for the Boakai administration,” Nyei said. “The new leadership will have to review concessions agreements signed by Weah and Ellen’s governments to establish which one works in the interest of Liberia (and) seek new international partners that will help address some of the country’s challenges.”
Monrovia resident Ansu Banban Jr. said he thinks Boakai will improve the lives of citizens. “I do not expect anything less than good from the president,” Banban said.
Boakai has a public reputation as a “hardworking and humble politician” whose personality and political experience suggest he “may show more dedication toward combating corruption than previous administrations,” said Zoe McCathie, a political and security analyst at Africa-focused Signal Risk Consulting.
“Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Boakai will be able to fully address this matter due to the entrenched nature of corruption within Liberian politics,” McCathie said. “Achieving sustained economic growth is expected to be an uphill battle for the Boakai administration (because) of the Liberian economy’s lack of diversification and dependence on imports.”
Source: AP