Ahead of Cameroon’s legislative and municipal elections scheduled for February 9, the country’s ruling party held a meeting under a heavy police presence with fear of secessionist attacks.

It was held in Buea, the capital of the English speaking southwest region where separatists recently declared the upcoming elections illegal and announced a six-day “lockdown”.

Parliamentary and local elections have been postponed twice due to the security situation. Derick Ekona, opposition SDF activist told the media of the challenges that exist: “There are always threats, as you know.

We take risks but we take really calculated risks because if all these people stay at home how are they going to feed their families? People have to get out and we have to give people confidence that we’re going to change the system to make people feel safer.

Residents are concerned as the security situation in the Anglophone region continues to deteriorate.

Ebenezer Akonga, a Buea resident is skeptical about the polls taking place: “Everyone’s in the bush, and we don’t know how the election will happen.

“We cleared the land, we did everything we could to get people to come into town, but they are not coming. Now, when we say that there is an election on February 9, we do not know if it will take place,” he added.

In three years, the clashes in the English speaking Northwest and Southwest regions have left at least 3,000 dead and more than 700,000 displaced.

Source: Africa News

Despite the biting hardship, many are still hoping that one day they could be appointed for them to help loot the treasury. They have been contributing financially toward the upkeep of the CPDM, a party that has brought untold hardship and poverty to Cameroonians.

Here below is a list of people from Eyumojock Sub-Division who have made contributions towards the CPDM Campaign

1) Prof. Ako Edward Oben=125,000

2) Chief Oruh Julius Agbor =75,000

3) Mr. Teku Tanyi Teku= 125,000

4) Mr. Ojong Martin Ojongfung = 50,000

5) Ms. Takor Monica  15000

6) Ms.Ndip Carolyn Ewube= 15,000

7) Mr. Thompson  Tabe Ndip= 20,000

8) Mr. Tabot Martin Ayuk= 50,000

9) Prof. Ebot Ebot Enaw=125000

10) Dr. Nkengasu Williams Oben= 15,000

11) Mr. Oben James Agbor=15,000

12) Dr. Eta Collins Ayuk= 50000

13) Mr. Abey Napoleon  Ntui=10,000

14) Chief Mbi Oruh Micheal= 15,000

15) Ms.  Eya Ayuk Scholarstica=15000

16) Mayor Julius Nkom Mkpot= 100,000

17) Mr Akat Peter Takang= 10,000

18) Mme Ayuk Efimbi Sarah=10,000

19) Dr. Eta  Enow Moses=10,000

20) Ntuifam Ita  Ayamba =20,000

21) Mr. Etengeneng Johanes Ojong=10000

22)  Mr. Agbormbi James=15,000

23) Chief Agbor Ndip David= 15,000

24) Dr. Arrey  Bisong Ettah=15,000

25) Mr. Ndip Nelson Mboh=10,000

26) Chief Ewo Martin= 15,000

27) Mr. Ebone Paul Tiku=50,000

28) Mr. Enokenwa Thomas Nsoawu =10,000

29) Ms. Ayuk Elizabeth Nkongho=10,000

30) Prof. Athenasius Ayuk Ako=100,000

31)  Chief Obenefonde  Moses = 15,000

32) Mr. Samuel Agbortabi=30,000

33) Ms. Winifred Bessem Ayuk Arrey= 10,000

34) Prof. Ndip Roland= 25,000

The Ambazonia Interim Government has declared Cameroon’s upcoming parliamentary and municipal elections illegal, announcing a six-day “lockdown” in the country’s West in the lead up to the 9 February poll. Preparations for the vote have been met with fierce resistance by separatists, as the AGC – which, in 2017, declared an independent state in English-speaking Western Cameroon – pushes back against the authority of Paul Biya’s Francophone government in Yaoundé. In December, Voice of Africa reported that approximately forty candidates for office were abducted by militants, and earlier this month fighters claimed responsibility for burning down a government election office in Misaje.

Political parties such as the Social Democratic Front (SDF) opposition are now weighing up their participation in the elections, wary of backlash from militants. President Biya himself, meanwhile, announced further troop deployments to the region in his new year’s address, insisting that the elections would go ahead as planned. With Cameroon deeply divided, observers have lambasted the international community’s disinterest in the crisis. Last week, Hannibal Uwaifo, President of the African Bar Association, wrote to Boris Johnson to criticize Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth, as well as the UN, for “refus[ing] to speak decisively” on the issue even as the situation deteriorates.

Tensions over the elections will only compound the already-dire humanitarian conditions in Western Cameroon. ACAPS notes that 40% of health centres in the English-speaking region have closed, with a dearth of hospital beds and medical professionals contributing to the spread of diseases such as cholera. Last year, UNICEF said that more than 80% of schools in Western Cameroon had been shut at the behest of militias since 2017. Already, the UN estimates that the collapse of essential services has led to the internal displacement of nearly 700,000 people, with a further 50,000 refugees fleeing across the border into Nigeria. The election “lockdown” announced by the AGC will force remaining schools, markets and businesses to close, and a round-the-clock curfew will be imposed. In addition, the Biya government’s provocative promise of a heightened military presence in the coming weeks is unlikely to safeguard the electoral process, and may instead serve to further inflame the situation.

The crisis is the latest – and most violent – expression of longstanding grievances held by Western Cameroon’s English-speaking population. The region, previously a separate British colony, was united with French Cameroon as an independent state following a closely fought referendum in 1961. In 1972, another contentious referendum abolished the country’s federal system – which had preserved some of the West’s independence – and replaced it with a unitary state with a powerful central government. The trajectory toward Francophone dominance has continued under President Biya, and regional autonomy has been further eroded in the nearly forty years that have passed since he came to power. Strikes and protests against further centralization began in 2016, catalyzing a series of violent clashes and ultimately leading to the AGC’s declaration of independence the following year.

The failures of a summit called by the Cameroonian government last year are instructive in assessing what must change in order to achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Though President Biya’s ‘Major National Dialogue’ involved multiparty meetings, it sidelined the leaders of the separatist movements themselves, many of whom boycotted the event, and some of whom were in jail. Moreover, the lack of international oversight – a precondition for the participation of several separatist groups – undermined the legitimacy of the talks and enabled the Biya government to persist unchecked with their focus on military force in responding to the crisis. Meaningful attempts by the international community to alleviate the crisis are a necessity, especially in the cases of Britain and France – the countries whose cartographical choices helped land Cameroon in this situation. Without that involvement, and as long as the Biya government and the separatist groups refuse to engage in a meaningful dialogue, the dreadful material costs of the violence will continue to be borne by the people of Cameroon.

Culled from The Organization for world peace

As the February 9, 2020, elections approach, Cameroon’s ruling and ruining party, the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM), has taken its show to the road.

The CPDM has sent its delegations to major cities in the two English-speaking regions of the country where there is total insecurity and these delegations are protected by soldiers and their armored vehicles, something that is not applied to opposition political parties.

The CPDM says that is advanced democracy. The party still considers itself as the national party, where there is no distinction between the state and party. Cameroon is a country without any campaign financing laws and misuse of state resources by the ruling party is considered normal.

Back to the drama. Ashiri Kilo, the head of the CPDM delegation to Kumbo, rambled in a bid to stir the population into standing up against the Amba fighters who are now responsible for law and order in the Northwest and Southwest regions.

After delivering her normal and senseless speech, she promptly left the place, as she knew that the consequences of what she had said could be dire. She made it in one piece to Bamenda, but their family home in Sop, her native village, was not lucky. It was torched and many family members have been left homeless.

In Bamenda, the usual noises were made by the usual suspects.  Yang Philemon, the former prime minister and a key member of the delegation to the northwest province was not happy to head to his native northwest. He was heard grumbling about the useless and meaningless visits to the regions.

A source close to the former prime minister said that he was not really in favor of those risky trips to the northwest, but he has no choice. He has eaten and dined with the devil. He must play by the rules, as failure to comply might result in an unpleasant situation.

His predecessor, Inoni Ephraim, can tell him how it feels like to be in the Yaoundé Maximum Security Prison after having been the country’s prime minister. It does not seem like it is pleasant, as Inoni has ended up with lots of illnesses and is out of the country seeking better healthcare that they cannot provide to Cameroonians.

The drama also played out in the Southwest region. In Mamfe, Senator and former chief of Bachou Ntai, George Tabetando, led a delegation of chicken-hearted fellows who sneaked into the Manyu Divisional headquarters of Mamfe and conducted business with no fanfare.

The Mamfe town hall that could seat more than 2,000 people was virtually empty, as Amba fighters had given a stern warning to residents to stay away from the CPDM soap opera. The injunction stated that anybody who attended the event will have to pay a huge fine and anyone caught with CPDM memorabilia would face the death penalty. The CPDM is now considered by Southern Cameroonians as the Corona-virus which could lead to death.

Only so-called external elites who are still working hard to maintain their small positions in the civil service and a few hungry locals showed up, but they only wore their CPDM uniforms when they were inside the venue of the meeting. But danger was locking very close to home, despite the presence of soldiers who themselves are showing signs of fatigue.

The Amba injunction was being respected by everybody. The meeting lasted for less than one hour. Senator Tabetando who had asked for forgiveness the last time he was in Mamfe went back to commit his usual crimes. The CPDM is a crime syndicate and a terrorist organization in Southern Cameroons and associating with it is a crime that carries the death penalty. Mr. Tabetando and his delegation were aware of the penalty, so they left the city immediately after their drama and melted to an unknown destination.

Onlookers only heard him giving instructions to his driver to drive as fast as possible and that he should not stop anywhere, as Amba boys could emerge from nowhere. Tabetando has not yet been forgiven. He has also lost his throne as the chief of Bachou Ntai. There is a death penalty hanging over him as the Sword of Damocles. He has made things worse by going to preach about the special status in a territory that is hostile to the mess they call special status.

In Bangem, it was Prof. Elvis Ngole Ngole who was the lead clown. He had been locked up in an armoured car throughout the journey. He knows there is also a death penalty awaiting him in Southern Cameroons. Speaking to a journalist of the CRTV, a state-owned media outfit only comparable to the Soviet Pravda  (The Truth) which has been misinforming Cameroonians for decades,  Prof. Ngole Ngole, noted for his rambling, produced some of his laughable expressions which did not make any sense to the local population that holds him in low esteem.

After his TV show, Elvis Ngole Ngole and his people disappeared into East Cameroon conscious of the consequences that may come their way as the day was wearing out. This drama was uncalled for. The CPDM has already won the elections. The results are known. Out of 180 seats, the opposition has only filed 46 candidates, as many of their candidates were disqualified by the election body, ELECAM, which is a wing of the ruling CPDM.

Some CPDM candidates are already celebrating their victory. Since there are no opposition candidates in certain constituencies, the CPDM candidates already know that they will be declared winners. For example, Mr. Ekole Peters, the former general manager of CAMTAINER, a member of the CPDM Central Committee from Konye in Meme Division, is already popping his champagne. His victory is already in his pocket. There is no opposition party list in Konye. But for now, he cannot celebrate aloud, as he could attract very angry Amba fighters who are always ready to inflict excruciating pain on those who are helping the Yaoundé government in its efforts to exploit the people.

The exercise itself is a waste of time. An exercise in futility! The world is aware of the government’s gimmicks and nobody is taking the government seriously.   Even in East Cameroon, there is no enthusiasm. The population is tired. For 37 years, nothing has changed. The same people have been in parliament for decades. Many have been in parliament for 50 years and there is nothing to prove that they have the people’s interest at heart. This year’s elections are simply a formality.

By Soter Tarh Agbaw-Ebai in the United Kingdom

While the crisis in Anglophone Cameroon shows no real signs of letting up, on February 9th Cameroonians will nonetheless head to the polls for legislative and municipal elections. The international community’s weak commitment to mediation, the factionalization of the Anglophone movement, and the government’s scorched earth tactics have perpetuated a slow-burning conflict that shows little signs of letting up. The most important Anglophone groups boycotted a Major National Dialogue held in October. The recent legislation of a “special status” for Northwest and Southwest regions has failed to attract support from the most prominent Anglophone groups, who now see federalism as the negotiating starting point.

Nonetheless, Paul Biya is pushing ahead. At stake are 180 seats in the National Assembly and 374 local government councils. The exercise is entirely devoid of sincere democratic meaning.  Maurice Kamto and the MRC – only recently released from lengthy detentions following the contentious events of 2018’s presidential election – have boycotted. The SDF’s decision to participate has fractured the party and led to violent threats against their candidates. The UPC’s entire legislative slate was temporarily deemed ineligible to run by the electoral management body. Other parties have lamented the severe security restrictions placed on the electoral process, while separatist groups have threatened to disrupt any attempt to hold an election.

What is the point if the outcome is not in doubt and no credible election can be held? The election will reveal very little about how popular Paul Biya is, and no international observer could sincerely believe that the election will be free and fair. 2020 will be yet another year Cameroon’s long history of authoritarianism.

Scholars increasingly identify such elections as opportunities for autocrats to replenish internal support and build a more compliant political elite. Burgeoning literature has identified legislatures as key institutions that help perpetuate authoritarian rule. Authoritarian legislatures generally lack the capacity to actually legislate and are subservient to the presidency. Therefore, rather than joining the legislature to pursuit policy aims, the legislature offers elites institutionalized access to a steady stream of formal and informal material benefits. In exchange for this access, members of parliament (MPs) are expected to mobilize electoral support and demonstrate loyalty to the regime in public forums. Nomination on the ruling party’s ticket usually means that an MP will win the general election, so all the drama occurs behind the scenes during the candidate selection process.

But, selecting people to serve in the legislature is tricky. To mobilize support, especially in poor countries like Cameroon, MPs must expend significant resources on campaigning. Once in office, MPs are also expected to divert the state budget to the benefit of their constituents, and to themselves spend money to meet constituent demands. Across Africa, this quality of elections has led to a dramatic increase in the number of business elites who have entered the legislature. In authoritarian settings, this is often referred to as “competitive clientelism.” The problem for autocrats is that business elites are not always vetted by a credible selection process. Under certain circumstances, business elites could simply be the highest bidders rather than true regime loyalists.

How do regimes cultivate a candidate base that can simultaneously mobilize electoral support while also ensuring loyalty to the regime?

In my research, I argue that Cameroon’s ruling party has banked on a steady stream of candidates from the civil service. The civil service in Cameroon has historically served as a main avenue for socioeconomic advancement. Cameroon’s first president encouraged the creation of prestigious grand ecoles, in particular a civil service training academy called ENAM, to recruit a new political class into the regime. Admission into these schools was informally based on ethnic quotas, and graduation generally ensured a promising career for aspiring elites. For an authoritarian regime like Cameroon’s, the civil service structured career paths provided a mechanism for monitoring that new elite and identifying those deserving of promotion to other institutions like the legislature. This tool was, arguably, particularly important in Cameroon, where the ruling party lacked cohesion and did not have a robust grassroots presence to recruit and vet candidates.

With the transition to multiparty election in 1992, the ruling CPDM began to use local primaries to select legislative candidates. The result was an explosion in candidacy and severe intra-party tensions over the selection process. Some of the criticisms were over the influx of cash into primaries, which benefitted the wealthiest candidates. Others claimed that local primaries helped entrench local ethnic groups in power. While the CPDM’s central committee ultimately endorsed the final candidate list, overturning local results proved equally problematic. In an effort to re-exert control, in 2013 the CPDM did away with primaries and began to adjudicate all electoral lists within the central committee. This same selection system was used at the end of 2019 to choose the 2020 legislative (and municipal) slate. In practice, local party members still have sway over the nomination process, and the CPDM at times encourages lists to merge for the sake of local solidarity.

In one of my research projects in Cameroon I track how the occupational backgrounds of MPs has evolved between 1972 and present day. I do this by tapping into difficult to access resumes and biographical records of over 800 MPs. Commensurate with expectations, since multipartyism the proportion of business elites has grown substantially. During the single-party era most legislative candidates came from a very narrow elite. These early MPs were primarily petty civil servants or public-school teachers. There was no business class to speak of. This changed dramatically in the 1990s with the liberalization of politics and the Cameroonian economy. By my estimate, business elites have risen from just 6% of the legislature to over 30%.

However, a second trend is the concurrent rise of MPs with government service backgrounds. This group of MPs primarily includes individuals who joined the civil service at a young age (often with degrees from ENAM) and worked in generic positions like Customs Official or Post and Telecommunications Engineer. MPs with government experience are once again the largest occupational category in the legislatures, at 48%. Notably, there was a big shift in 2013 when the CPDM changed its candidate selection process. Of the 51 regime MPs who were not renominated between 2007 and 2013, 43% were from the business community while just 29% came from government service. Their replacements were twice as likely to be former government workers than businesspeople. The below figure summarizes these trends. Note that the category “professional” includes business adjacent occupations like doctor or lawyer, while “other” is a residual category that captures occupations like “taxi driver” or “secretary.”

Why would a regime prefer candidates with civil service backgrounds? Given the historical role of the civil service in political recruitment it makes sense. As noted, civil service careers offer career ladders up which an eventual nominee must climb. Since the process is likely politicized, this provides an opportunity for aspiring elites to demonstrate their trustworthiness and partisan loyalty. Concurrently, government service provides eventual candidates with opportunities for wealth accumulation and provides them with familiarity with the bureaucratic workings of government. Consequently, once in office they can mobilize electoral support without all of the baggage that comes with a more independent business career. MPs with government service backgrounds can compete with business elites, while providing greater assurance to the regime.

The available data for 2020 reveals a similar story. While the occupational backgrounds of the new candidates are still unknown, we do know which MPs lost or retained their seats. The regime has stated that it was seeking to renew political blood in the legislature and encouraged the local party chapters to consider younger candidates. Indeed, more senior MPs were not renominated in 2019 than in 2013 (even though the overall age of the MPs retained is similar). Moreover, despite local competition, many long-serving MPs retained their seats, like the Speaker of the House Cavaye Djibril. Managing inter-generational tensions is another reason the regime has exercised more control over candidate selection, and another key function of this legislative exercise.

We also know that of the 56 regime candidates not renominated in 2019, 26% had professional backgrounds, 25% had business backgrounds, 20% had government backgrounds, 20% had educational backgrounds, and 9% came from other occupations. Once again, this indicates a slight preference for candidates with some form of government service. Categorizing the occupational backgrounds of their replacements is currently ongoing.

These legislative elections have been delayed for nearly two years. During that time the security situation in Northwest and Southwest regions have not improved.  Yet, the pressure to gain access to the resources that a legislative seat conveys have not changed. Likewise, as the regime faces greater international scrutiny of its activities during this conflict, it needs strong allies to advocate for it in the public sphere. The 2020 legislative election primarily serves this function. It allows Paul Biya to reshuffle the political elite, use his control over candidate selection to position stronger allies, and present the illusion of a legitimate democratic process.

Culled from Presidential-power.net

Cameroon’s Prime Minister, Dion Ngute, and staunch member of the ruling CPDM also known as the crime syndicate, has met with the fake pastor and conman, Nkongho Success, who might have tried hard to reinvent himself, but has failed woefully as he has never really played any major role in the crisis that is tearing the country apart.

Mr. Nkongho, who burnt his Cameroon passport on camera in Nigeria, has now become a pro-government agent who is betraying many Southern Cameroonians.

The conman, who escaped to Nigeria even before the crisis began because he deceived many people that he would grant them visas to the United States, has used the Southern Cameroons situation  to get his way back home.

He is now lodged in Yaoundé and he is being used by the country’s territorial Administration minister, Atanga Nji, himself a conman and an ex-convict, to do the government’s dirty work.

Mr. Success Nkongho, who can no longer go to his native Mamfe, is constantly being sent by the cash-strapped and barefaced government to go and negotiate the return of more Cameroonians living abroad, many of whom are not even refugees.

The doctor of fraud, also known as Failure Nkongho, had his entire family moved to Yaoundé before he landed there with a bunch of wanderers who had nothing to do with the crisis that has resulted in the killing of some 5,000 Southern Cameroonians and the displacement of one million people.

Since returning to Cameroon, conman Nkongho Success has been struggling to convince the fearless Field Marshall of the Red Dragons of Lebialem to drop down his weapons and bring his fighters to Yaoundé.

While his attempts to rope in Field Marshal into the mess he has created for himself has not been fruitful, the government is now using deputy minister of the economy, Paul Tasong, to reach out to the fighter who has remained a nightmare to the government.

Mr. Paul Tasong has promised that six council seats would be filled by Field Marshal’s protégés if he put paid to the fighting, at least during the election period.

Paul Tasong is still facing huge bumps in his way as Field Marshal is not taking the bait, including promises of money.

Paul Tasong wants Member of Parliament Forji, a CPDM stalwart, to win the upcoming parliamentary election and if the fighting continues, his wish will never come true.

The Yaoundé government is used to dealing with conmen, which makes many Cameroonians to hold that the ruling party, from where many ministers are appointed, is a crime syndicate made out of the same mold as the Sicilian Mafia.

Many analysts and observers of the Cameroon political scene hold that it won’t be long for Mr. Success Nkongho, who has been singing like a magpie, to be killed and disposed of like used tissue by the same government that is pretending to protect him after his return to Yaoundé.

Mr. Nkongho has no real value when it comes to the crisis and he will soon be discovered by a government that is desperate and in a haste to put an end to a crisis that has left it with a bloodshot eye.

By Joan Atemkeng in Yaounde