Northern Cameroon has for decades been a hub for ammunition, small arms and light weapons trafficking in the Sahel. The problem has fuelled regional insecurity since 1980. In response, states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission created the Multinational Joint Task Force in 1994.

But arms trafficking has worsened since Boko Haram’s emergence and expansion into Cameroon in 2013. In the past decade, Cameroon’s defence forces have seized and destroyed over 3 000 weapons and items of military equipment.

Northern Cameroon covers the Far North, North and Adamawa regions, which form part of the Sahelian belt. This part of Cameroon shares borders with Nigeria, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), and experiences a lot of smuggling and trafficking.

Due to various insurrections, Nigeria has become fertile ground for the manufacture of homemade weapons. In Chad, numerous conflicts since the 1970s – including rebellions and reversals of political power – have led to a proliferation of small arms.

Coupled with various forms of violent extremism, the rebellion of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara, which developed during the 1990s in Niger’s Diffa and Agadez regions, bordering Chad, also increased the circulation of weapons. And Chad’s proximity to Libya, which has been afflicted by civil war over several decades, has exacerbated the problem.

The CAR, for its part, is experiencing a long cycle of socio-political instability. Between 2004 and 2014, the groups involved in the country’s three bloody civil wars engaged in intense arms trafficking. But despite a 2013 United Nations Security Council arms embargo, weapons continue circulating.

Institute for Security Studies research shows that weapons pass through corridors used for illicit trade, migratory flows and transhumance. To reach Boko Haram in Nigeria, guns from Chad pass through the country’s capital N’Djamena, and are then smuggled through Kousseri and Fotokol in Cameroon. Or they pass through Cameroon’s Mora and surrounding areas.

Weapons are also leaving Boko Haram strongholds to fuel insecurity in Northern Cameroon. Their route follows an axis between Gwoza in Nigeria, and Mayo-Tsanaga and Mayo-Louti or Bénoué in Cameroon.

Weapons from Chad and CAR, used for kidnappings for ransom in Cameroon’s Northern and Adamaoua regions, pass through Touboro and Garoua-Boulaï. Traffickers bringing in arms from Niger and Sudan use the cross-border transhumance routes, many converging towards Cameroon’s north.

Traffickers use various means to transport weapons. Some pose as traders, hiding guns in goods, especially cereal bags. Others disguise themselves as transporters of goods and people, hiding weapons in their vehicles. Many nomads moving in and between the countries mentioned above are also arms smugglers.

These weapons add to the region’s insecurity. They contribute to existing community conflicts – particularly disputes between farmers and breeders, indigenous and non-native populations, inheritance conflicts and religious antagonisms.

Urgent measures are needed to curb the problem. A 2016 Cameroonian law imposes three months to two years’ imprisonment for arms trafficking. In 2018, Cameroon hosted the conference of the Central African states party to the Kinshasa Convention for the control of small arms and light weapons. Cameroon and Nigeria also met in September 2022 to discuss collaborating to combat the problem.

On the ground, defence and security forces have managed to seize weapons during their operations. However, faced with the growing scale of the problem, this is not enough. Cameroon’s 2016 law should be amended to enable harsher penalties for arms trafficking. And greater political commitment is needed to translate recommendations from conferences into action.

Concrete steps must be taken at national, regional and interregional levels. At the national level, Cameroon and its neighbouring countries must strengthen their policies against arms trafficking by imposing tougher measures. In addition to raising the alarm in the event of a security threat, local community committees must help collect information about the circulation of weapons.

At the regional level, the gendarmes, police, military, ecoguards and customs officers from Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and CAR need a significant boost in logistical capacity. They also need a collaborative mechanism that allows rapid response and coordination of joint actions to stop arms trafficking.

Finally, at the interregional level, the ad hoc committees in charge of the issue, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force or the Brazzaville Convention, must share lessons on what works.

Source: Defenseweb

Cameroonian authorities must disclose which journalists, in addition to murdered journalist Martinez Zogo, have been targeted for surveillance by the country’s counterintelligence service and ensure that spying on members of the media is immediately discontinued, the Committee to Protect Journalists said Friday.

The existence of a surveillance operation that allegedly spied on Zogo since at least 2015 was disclosed in a 20-page referral to trial document reviewed by CPJ. The document was part of a judicial investigation into the January 2023 kidnapping, torture, and murder of the popular radio host, which was finalized on February 29, 2024.

Seventeen suspects are expected to stand trial, on a date yet to be set, in a military court in the capital, Yaoundé, on charges including murder, complicity and conspiracy to murder, complicity and conspiracy to torture, complicity to kidnap, and violation of instructions, according to the document and news reports.

The suspects include:

Léopold Maxime Eko Eko, former head of the counterintelligence agency General Directorate for External Research (DGRE)

Justin Danwe, former DGRE director of operations

Jean-Pierre Amougou Belinga, an influential businessman and head of the privately owned media group L’Anecdote

Bruno François Bidjang, L’Anecdote managing director and news presenter for privately owned television station Vision 4

“The revelation that a surveillance operation targeted popular radio host Martinez Zogo since at least 2015 raises concerns about which other journalists have been surveilled by Cameroon’s counterintelligence agency,” said Angela Quintal, head of CPJ’s Africa program in New York. “Cameroonian authorities must make a full disclosure and ensure the end to all surveillance, physical or electronically, of journalists. The unfettered practice is not only a violation of journalists’ right to privacy but has serious consequences for source protection.”

Zogo was found dead on January 22, 2023, after going missing five days earlier.  A week before his abduction, Zogo publicly accused Belinga of widespread corruption involving funds from the Cameroonian treasury during his radio show Embouteillage (Gridlock).

The court document reviewed by CPJ was prepared by lead investigating judge, Lieutenant-Colonel Pierrot Narcisse Nzié, the third investigating judge in the case who was appointed in December after the previous judge ordered the controversial release of Belinga and Eko Eko. The pair remained in detention after authorities claimed that the release order was fake.

The document describes how DGRE agents led by Danwe, under the influence of Belinga, allegedly carried out the kidnapping and torture of Zogo in Ebogo, a district of the capital Yaoundé, on January 17, 2023. Part of this team returned to the scene an hour later for a second operation that “resulted in Zogo’s death” by “strangulation and torture.”

The court document said Eko Eko denied involvement, saying Zogo was never a threat to him and the operation against the journalist was Danwe’s personal initiative; however, Nzié said Eko Eko could not claim this, as he had ordered the DGRE to surveil the journalist since 2015 as part of the “Presse” dossier.  The court documents did not elaborate further but said the surveillance operation ordered by Eko Eko was confirmed by another witness,  Emmanuella Moudie, the chief of the DRGE’s electronic surveillance division.

Zogo’s surveillance was also corroborated by Yves Saïwang, another suspect facing trial and an officer in the DGRE’s electronic surveillance division, who “bluntly” declared during questioning that Zogo was the target of the DGRE’s surveillance, according to the court document. Saïwang also said that since 2017, he was responsible for monitoring Zoga. Eko Eko had never taken any measures to prevent this and could not escape responsibility, Nzié said in the court document.

Saïwang also said he sent Danwe geolocation information about Zogo via WhatsApp and then received 20,000 francs (US $33), according to the document. Heudji Guy Serge, another DGRE officer who is also a suspect in the trial, said he, too, provided technical information to Danwe about Zogo and received 15,000 francs (US $25).

Denis Omgba Bomba, director of the media observatory at Cameroon’s Ministry of Communication, told CPJ that there was no surveillance “program” dedicated to journalists but that as Zogo was a public figure, the surveillance was a normal intelligence operation. Bomba added that the protection of journalists’ sources is not absolute and that the state can ignore this for security reasons.

Authorities charged Bidjang with conspiracy to torture, conspiracy to arrest, and kidnapping in relation to Zogo’s murder, according to the court document. He is detained in Yaoundé’s Principal Prison on separate charges of revolt, incitement to insurrection, rebellion, and spreading false news, his lawyer, Charles Tchoungang, told CPJ.

Source: CPJ